My research lies at the intersection of epistemology, ethics, and 19th-century philosophy (especially Kierkegaard). Most of my research focuses specifically on the ethics of belief: that is, how ethical considerations affect what we ought to believe.

One of my primary research projects—building on work from my dissertation—addresses Kierkegaard’s ethics of belief. This project has two complementary aims: 1) to contribute to Kierkegaard scholarship by articulating a sophisticated and defensible interpretation of Kierkegaard’s ethics of belief using concepts from contemporary analytic philosophy, and 2) to contribute to the contemporary ethics of belief literature by developing ideas from Kierkegaard’s authorship to defend a positive account of the ethics of belief.

In addition to this Kierkegaard-focused project, I have a series of papers in normative epistemology and the ethics of belief, inquiry, and emotion. These papers aim to explain why our outright beliefs about others are ethically significant, and how practical and epistemic (or more broadly, fittingness-related) considerations interact to determine what we ought to believe, when we ought to inquire, and which emotions we ought to have.

Beyond these two main projects, I have ongoing research interests at the intersection of political epistemology and the ethics of belief, and in the broader history of the ethics of belief and related attitudes (focusing on figures such as Aquinas, Kant, and Nietzsche).